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The WTO is not the GATT.  No new round can start, and 
more importantly, no new round can conclude without 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) and developing country 
interests being addressed and resolved.  To secure LDC 
support, and maintain LDC support, progress must be real. 
 
- Former WTO Director General Mike Moore 
 
                                                 
* Michael Ilg, Ph.D. candidate, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
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I. Introduction 
The issue of agricultural liberalization is among the most 
contentious facing the WTO.  Beyond the implications for the 
international trade regime, agriculture is representative of a modern debate 
over globalization in which international forces encroach upon domestic 
autonomy.  A distinction forms that has the benefits of trade liberalization 
opposed to the non-economic functions of agriculture support. Although 
the issue of liberalization is readily divided, the distinction is problematic 
because a resolution implicates both international and domestic concerns.  
This paper advocates consumer choice as the means of reconciling 
the conflict between international trade liberalization and domestic social 
purpose.  It is an attempt to form a theoretical framework that facilitates 
the benefits of trade while preserving domestic autonomy.  First, 
agricultural liberalization is necessary in order to minimize the extreme 
costs of protectionism that are placed upon the consumer, the taxpayer, 
and the foreigner producer alike.  Second, the inefficiencies and trade 
distortions that flow from protectionism are but misguided means to serve 
legitimate ends.  Democratic principle requires that domestic interests are 
not excluded from international policy decisions. 
The essential characteristic of a consumer choice model is that 
decisions are made by individuals in the domestic market and not by states 
in the international system. Trade promotion coupled with individual 
choice, therefore, mandates an altered role for the state.  Rather than using 
outmoded mechanisms that obscure subsidies and externalize their effect, 
states must adapt to globalization with options that promote informed 
accountability.  Globalization has greatly reduced the sovereignty of states 
and has created an international marketplace. It is necessary for citizens to 
become attuned to their increased responsibility.  States need to develop a 
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system in which traditional policy objectives may be satisfied in 
nontraditional ways.  It is a complex situation in which the individual self-
interest of the consumer must gain a social context.  Consumers will need 
to decide whether to assume the costs of achieving social objectives.  Only 
in this fashion will the fair functioning of open markets produce results 
that are both transparent and democratic.    
II.  Agriculture and the GATT 
Development of the GATT and Agricultural Trade 
The tremendous growth of international trade in the post-WWII 
period did not extend to all products equally, and the agricultural sector is 
among the most notable exceptions to a general trend of trade growth.  
“An analysis of the history of the GATT as it relates to agriculture would 
conclude that this is an area in which the GATT has had ‘meagre 
success.’”1  The failure to liberalize trade in agriculture should not be 
viewed merely as an oversight of the insignificant, but rather as a 
conscious exclusion of the controversial.   
The contentiousness of agriculture is recognized by its prominent 
place within the history of the GATT’s dispute settlement system, with 
over 40 percent of all disputes involving agriculture.2 The relative 
insulation of agriculture from trade liberalization is, therefore, 
representative of concerted diplomatic design. It represents an 
entrenchment of domestic policy protection into the international 
framework for trade promotion.  
The institutional preferences for agriculture are most clearly 
viewed in the GATT provisions on quantitative restrictions, Article XI, 
                                                 
1 Joseph A. McMahon, Going Bananas? – Dispute Resolution in Agriculture, in DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 128 (James Cameron and Karen 
Campbell eds., 1998). 
2 Id.  
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and subsidies, Article XVI. Quantitative Restrictions: In addition to the 
looser interpretative exceptions of Article XI (2) (a) and (b), which permit 
prohibitions of a temporary nature and those necessary for meeting 
domestic standards respectively, XI (2) (c) permits import restrictions on 
any agricultural or fisheries product where necessary to enforce domestic 
restrictions of similar or substitutable products.3  As initially constituted, 
these provisions do not expressly establish a regime of domestic 
protectionism, as there is the requirement of ensuring the maintenance of 
foreign market share, theoretically indicating that “it should make 
quantitative restrictions a rather unattractive instrument of agricultural 
protection, since foreigners end up with a market share equal to that which 
would exist in the absence of protection.”4 This theoretical constraint 
found little translation into actual practice, however, as the major trading 
powers consistently seek a broad interpretation of agricultural exceptions, 
often straining if not threatening the entire trade regime.   
Export Subsidies: The general prohibition on export subsidies is 
subject to an exception for primary products, so long as “they not be 
applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product,…”5 A 
working definition of “equitable share of world export trade” proved 
allusive and international trade distortions in agriculture continued at an 
incredible pace.  As with the interpretation of Article XI, so too were the 
provisions of XVI broadly construed to the point of an almost carte 
blanche exclusion of agriculture from GATT applicability. 
 
 
                                                 
3 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LEGAL ORDER at 192 (Routledge 1995). 
4 Id. at 193. 
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The Agricultural Compromise 
 
The exceptionalism afforded agricultural products can be seen as 
containing both a normative movement and a degree of unresponsiveness 
to institutional regulation.  The GATT agreement was formed with a weak 
normative commitment to the equal consideration of traded goods, to 
which any subsequent attempts at strengthening resulted in the avoidance 
of obligations.  In the Pasta or Banana disputes for instance, the EU 
collectively chose to block the adoption of panel decisions that found 
GATT contrary subsidy and import restriction policies.  Although these 
disputes were eventually settled in negotiations with the US, it remains 
that the EU was willing to face costly retributive tariffs for the sake of 
fulfilling domestic policy objectives that took precedence over GATT 
compliance.  And far from unique, the examples of EU noncompliance are 
but recent manifestations of a long pattern of agriculture protection that 
has extended beyond satiating domestic interests and into the normative 
foundation of the system of post-WWII multilateralism.   
As early as 1955 a compromise was reached: “the US requested 
and received a waiver under Article XXV largely exempted its domestic 
farm programmes from GATT scrutiny.  This waiver obtained by the 
world’s largest and supposedly most liberal trader did serious damage to 
the legitimacy and the functioning of the GATT.”6 A simple compromise: 
the US was able to protect its agricultural producers; the GATT was 
permitted to exist.   
Embedded Liberalism and Agriculture 
“Embedded liberalism” could be said to be the normative 
compromise between the economic systems that had failed so terribly in 
                                                                                                                         
5 Id. at 194. 
6 ROBERT WOLFE, FARM WARS 59 (Macmillan 1998). 
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the first half of the Twentieth Century, “unlike the economic nationalism 
of the 1930s, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of 
the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated on 
domestic interventionism.”7 Embedded liberalism, therefore, reflects the 
shared belief in the need to promote international stability through 
transparency and predictability, while at the same time maintaining the 
ability of states to pursue what John Ruggie terms “legitimate social 
purpose”.8  
The social embeddedness of trade is often overlooked, both in 
elemental conceptions on the nature of economics and the more 
rudimentary analysis of trade.  Simply viewing agricultural products to be 
analyzed in terms of comparative advantages and relative inefficiencies 
obscures the extent to which agriculture has developed as a component of 
social policy within developed countries.   
That many developed nations have articulated agricultural policies 
can be seen as a response to the diminishing role of the farmer and the 
changing patterns of production; it is essentially a means of domestic 
interventionism.  When the majority of people are involved in farming, it 
is hardly necessary to distinguish an agricultural policy from that of the 
general economic policy of the national government.   “States do not have 
sectoral policies until the sector’s interest can be seen to diverge from 
those of society as a whole.”9  
The distinctly rural characteristic of agricultural production has 
ensured that policy makers in developed nations afford it different 
                                                 
7 John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:  Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES 209 (Cornell University Press 1983). 
8 Id. 
9 WOLFE, supra note 6, at 54. 
Vol. 3 [2005]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                            7  
   www.scu.edu/scjil 
 
 
 
treatment, for unlike industrial producers that may support a city or region, 
farmers approach something nearer to a definable “class”.   
When there are more farmers than other people, today 
generally in developing countries, agriculture tends to be 
taxed; when the share of farmers in the population starts to 
decline to trivial levels, as it has in OECD countries, 
agriculture tends to be supported, usually with the stated 
objective of maintaining farm income.10 
 
Policy Misconceptions of Developed Nations 
Representing the sustenance of rural communities, agricultural 
support was viewed as a means of promoting the dual function of easing 
the growing inequalities between rural and urban life as well as insulating 
farmers from international market fluctuations.  The special characteristics 
of agriculture would, however, result in a form of application unique 
within the embedded liberalism compromise.  “Unlike the rest of the 
welfare state, however, farm policy provided indirect support to people 
through the mechanisms of direct support for the prices received by 
producers.”11 The indirect support given to agricultural producers was 
dissimilar to other aspects of the welfare state as interventionism directly 
impacted upon world markets, despite hopes otherwise.  “The CAP, for 
example, was based upon on two misguided assumptions, first that the EU 
would remain a net importer of many farm products; and second, that 
growth in the world market would contain the cost of CAP while 
minimizing disruptions to world trade.”12 The effect was both increased 
inefficiency for protected farmers and massive distortions for the world 
economy. 
Premised upon conceptions of the agricultural crises of the 1930s, 
policies of many developed nations were unprepared for the changing 
                                                 
10 WOLFE, supra note 6, at 46. 
11 WOLFE, supra note 6, at 55. 
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dynamics of food production that led to the curious circumstance of 
spiraling food surpluses emanating from comparatively inefficient 
producers.  Slow growth in food demand coupled with rapidly expanding 
production ensured that domestic producers required increasing amounts 
of aid to cover the decreasing value of overabundant foodstuffs.  The cost 
of subsidization strategies such as the EU’s mammoth Common 
Agricultural Policy skyrocketed as distorted price realities supported 
inefficient producers, and under the cover of protection the growing 
efficiency gap, and thereby the costs continue until the system faces 
collapse.  Indeed, an OECD study suggests that multilateral trade reform 
in agriculture could yield over $450 billion per year in net welfare gains.13 
Clearly agricultural protectionism contains profound distortions that spiral 
damage outward with increasing intensity.  
The impact of agricultural subsidization upon the world market, 
and specifically developing producers, was overlooked for far too long.  
Agriculture support was not only premised upon misconceptions on the 
nature of productive realities, it was also contemplated with a narrow 
worldview.  International liberalism was envisioned as a multilateral 
method for ordering economic growth and stability, but the conception of 
“international” was decidedly limited, more accurately resembling the 
developed western world.  Ostensibly designed to facilitate trade in goods, 
the GATT facilitated the trade of industrial goods while agricultural 
products were insulated.  While this may be evidence of the power - 
influence arrangements in the post WWII period and their translation into 
institutional preferences, this situation is simply untenable in a global 
economy that has become completely “international”.  In 1955, the 
                                                                                                                         
12 WOLFE, supra note 6, at 77. 
13 See JONATHAN COPPEL & MARTINE DURAND, TRENDS in MARKET OPENNESS, 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKS PAPERS NO. 221, at 6 (1999). 
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continuing participation of the United States and the success of the GATT 
depended upon agricultural preferences and exemptions.  Now, the 
success of the GATT process depends upon agricultural trade concessions 
and the equality of advantage.   
III.  Agriculture and the Uruguay Round 
Progress – The Uruguay Round 
The first major breakthrough toward reducing agricultural 
protectionism occurred in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations with 
the creation of Agreement on Agriculture and the numerous individual 
commitments attached to the Marrakesh Protocol.14   Many significant 
developments may be found in the Agreement on Agriculture, amongst the 
most interesting is the categorization of domestic support methods into 
conceptual “boxes” of acceptability.  For instance, “Green Box” measures 
are methods of domestic support that are not viewed as trade distorting 
and therefore may continue indefinitely and are beyond GATT scrutiny.  
“Amber Box” measures, however, are those that are conceived of as trade 
distorting and must be phased out.  For example, agricultural research or 
training provided by the government is regarded as falling in the Green 
Box category, whereas government buying-in at a guaranteed price 
(market price support) counts as Amber Box.  This classification program 
has the obvious advantage of permitting governments a domestic function 
while at the same time ensuring that the costs for it are not borne 
externally.  
In addition to addressing domestically distorting policies, the 
Agricultural Agreement also contains significant provisions for reducing 
the external barriers to trade.  The measures, which limit market access, 
                                                 
14 See Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/13-mprot_e.htm (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2005).  
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are conditioned for removal by the creation of a tariff-only regime, or 
“tariffication,” as non-tariff barriers are converted into regular tariffs and 
duties, which may in turn be more readily removed.15 As seen throughout 
the history of the GATT, the process of tariffication has the dual benefit of 
increasing transparency as well as encouraging negotiated concessions; 
with the costs of protection clearly visible, their negotiated reduction is 
further facilitated.  While tariffication has been a pattern for success, it 
remains that states then must be willing to exchange the explicit added 
costs for gains in other areas.  Substantial “non-economic” factors in 
conjunction with domestic interest may make the transparent costs 
acceptable or even defensible.  
Gradual diplomatic negotiations eventually culminated in the 
compromise that is the Agriculture Agreement, representing not the 
assumption of one ideal by all but the conciliation of differing positions 
around an acceptable core.  While the Agricultural Agreement was a far 
cry from the abolition of subsidies hoped for by the US and Cairns group 
of countries, for the EU membership it was an undertaking of difficult and 
reluctant concessions.16 The wide discrepancy of interest that surrounds 
the issue of agricultural support cannot be resolved by trade diplomats 
alone, it must gain the legitimacy of applicability from national 
governments.   
A Hollow Victory? 
Evidence would suggest that the diplomatic success of the 
Uruguay Round is limited to a framework for compromise as there is still 
a significant lag in the normative maturation of this collectively assumed 
                                                 
15 See generally WTO documents on agricultural trade and market access, available at   
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro02_access_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
17, 2005). 
16 WOLFE, supra note 6, at 96. 
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undertaking.  For instance, an OECD working paper from 1999 found the 
past decade a bleak one for trade barrier reductions in agriculture: 
While much progress has been achieved in lowering 
protection on industrial goods, barriers to trade in 
agriculture remain pervasive in most OECD countries. 
Protection in the agricultural sector, as measured by 
producer support estimates (PSEs), has remained broadly 
constant at a very high in Japan at around 60 per cent and at 
about 40 per cent in the European Union and 20 per cent in 
the United States over the past decade.17 
 
A more detailed examination of the OECD’s empirical data reveals 
that in the five years following 1994 Canada and Australia alone had 
declining agricultural protection while the major trading powers, Japan, 
the EU and the United States, actually had increased levels of protection.18  
Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect instantaneous transformations 
resulting from trade negotiations, but the evidence of increasing protection 
in the wake of a supposed agricultural breakthrough is perhaps an 
alarming signal of the status quo.    
Moreover, in the months preceding the Ministerial Conference 
scheduled for November of 2001 in Dohan, there was explicit diplomatic 
initiatives on the part of developing members to table the issue of 
implementation regarding the Agricultural Agreement.  The proposed 
issues of implementation were divided into three categories: 1) Export 
Credits and Insurance; 2) Decision on Net Food-Importing Developing 
Countries; and 3) Tariff Quotas.  The broadness of the proposed issues 
reveals the extent to which pervasive obstacles remain embedded within 
the issue of agriculture.  Although the issues raised appear technical in 
nature, the underlying problem is fundamentally basic; a lack of normative 
will.  Cooperative structures certainly aid in the facilitation of stable and 
                                                 
17 Supra note 13, at 6.  
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predictable state interaction, but for frameworks to produce institutional or 
systemic change there must be the necessary political will.  So as 
constructual agreements prove seemingly ineffectual at coalescing 
reluctant powers like the EU, agriculture may well present a poignant 
example of a paradigmatic shift.     
New Pressures 
As the international trade regime stands facing increased calls for 
broader accountability, the paradigm of trade theory will be unresponsive 
unless a more expansive conception of trade is developed.  Beyond the 
merely binary argument of whether trade is beneficial or not, and the 
radicalized positions that view trade as an evil or protectionism as 
irrational, a real attempt should be made to articulate which principles are 
to guide the trade regime. Trade purely for the sake of trade will not be 
sufficient to overcome the remaining obstacles. 
As the words of the Director General of the WTO help illustrate, 
“the WTO is not the GATT.”19 The route with which the GATT 
progressed is not available to the WTO for the very success of the GATT 
has meant an altered system.  While the GATT has been successful in 
promoting trade liberalization, each round of success ushered in a degree 
of change that has left the WTO as an heir to both the gains and the 
accumulated antagonism.  A unique circumstance, success that is not an 
absolute quality; the more that is attained the more contentious a matter 
becomes.  As the focal point of what the GATT was, and now as the most 
obvious representation and institutionalization of the international trading 
system, the WTO faces burdens that the previous manifestation could not 
possibly have encountered. 
                                                                                                                         
18 See id. at 20 (Figure 1).  
19 General Mike Moore, Keynote Address at the Partnership Summit 2000 (Jan. 10, 
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm21_e.htm. 
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The minimalist basis that has been prevalent within trade theory, 
namely the notion of individuals as rationalistic and maximizing actors, is 
particularly well suited to a jurisprudence of diplomacy. Namely a process 
in which basic rationalism and game theory models are all that is 
necessary for explanation and justification.  However, as more diverse 
social actors claim access, and as the WTO creates legal jurisprudence, it 
becomes evident that a rational model based on self-interest alone is 
inadequate as precept of trade growth.  Legalism, even without the 
legitimacy afforded by sovereignty, imputes a measure of authority, an 
authority derived from constituting principles.  And so as the trade regime 
receives increasing international attention from diverse social actors, the 
focus must no longer lie solely with trade wonks and instead extend to 
trade as a socially constituted practice.   
Certainly the social component of trade shall be invoked if the next 
round of multilateral negotiations is in fact, as the Director General of the 
WTO suggests, a development round. Apart from the attention paid to 
clamoring NGOs, it is clear that before any further developments of the 
WTO can be contemplated a reconciliation of the present regime is 
required.  Towards reconciling the systemic inequalities and developed 
world preferences, the controversy over agriculture demand a resolution.  
The debate contains a highly symbolic element, putting the changing 
dynamics of the trade regime into full relief.  With the economic costs of 
subsidization now bordering on the impossible, the EU shall certainly 
have to compromise; the question will be how the political costs are to be 
minimized.  Agriculture has captured the imagination to such an extent 
that there will be considerable political consequence to simply 
surrendering this sector.  The previous practice of severing support to an 
inefficient industry and weathering the localized political storm is 
untenable in these circumstances.   
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With non-economic factors potentially impacting across entire 
societies, policymakers require a more comprehensive response than the 
binary framework of whether “to liberalize or not to liberalize?”  Initiative 
should be shown in extending the paradigm of trade to include an adaptive 
social setting in which the role of governments is to illustrate policy 
concerns and the linkages to personal consumption.  A government may 
have a goal of furthering the educational standing of its citizenry, but that 
this aim would be realized through excluding highly educated foreign 
nationals sounds preposterous.  Few governments need actively coerce 
individuals into higher education; rather societal influences ensure that 
there is such a demand if not the means.  With governments maintaining a 
developmental role it may help ensure that the benefits of trade, and the 
strengthening of the trade regime, may occur alongside of domestic goals 
and individual involvement.   
A New Paradigm? 
The GATT has been brilliantly successful at a simple task; a 
system of contractual agreements that allowed diffuse benefit through 
exchange concessions that parties had been previously unwilling to 
concede.  The trade regime acted as an instrument by which states could 
temporize inefficient sectors of the economy, using a far distant 
international agreement as a means to reorder domestic interests.  A 
decidedly pluralistic model; competing sectoral interests are effectively 
traded to exploit comparative advantages and sever inefficient producers.  
This romantic notion may well be at an end.  The attributes of the GATT, 
which have been so conducive to diplomatic tradeoffs, namely its 
flexibility and obscurity, have ended with the appearance of the WTO and 
its centrality within invigorated international attention.  Appearing 
concurrently with the rising publicity centering upon the WTO has been 
the issue of agriculture after its long enforced slumber, changing the 
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dynamics of trade negotiations and perhaps creating an impasse for 
efficiency that has not been seen before.  Beyond conceptions of the 
sectoral interests of pluralism, agriculture presents a situation of extensive 
domestic interest that essentially demands a more cognitive approach than 
traditional trade theory provides.   
Countries with large agricultural support programs have often 
claimed that the vast sums spent are not the simply the waste of 
inefficiency but are instead manifested in other essentially non-economic 
forms.  Trade critics have often view with derision the claims of non-
economic objectives, as the title of Professor Alan Winter’s OECD 
working paper is indicative of, “The So-Called ‘Non-Economic’ 
Objectives of Agricultural Support.”20 Viewing non-economic purposes in 
a so-called objective manner, Winters attempts a quantification of the 
unquantifiable.  In an interesting paper, Winters details the ways in which 
stated policy objectives are misdirected through agricultural support in 
such as areas maintaining farm income, preserving rural communities, 
environmental and pollution concerns.   
Detailing each objective, Winters then analyzes the economic 
merits of each and invariably reaches the conclusion that direct support 
would be preferable to the indirect subsidization method.  For instance, 
Winter suggests that maintaining farm income would be best served by 
direct income support, “While these are real problems, they do not seem 
sufficiently serious to rule direct income support of the set of acceptable 
policies.”21  That direct income support is basically social assistance is not 
addressed, and it is unclear upon what basis farmers would continue in 
                                                 
20 L. ALAN WINTERS, THE SO-CALLED “NON-ECONOMIC” ObJECTIVES OF 
AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES NO. 13 (1989-1990), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/43/34318482.pdf. 
21 Id. at 247. 
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their rural function if given government incentives that have no 
geographical tie and contain an implicit pressure to retrain. 
Arguably the most unquantifiable objective of agricultural support 
is that of the value of landscape or what Winters terms amenity.  Winters 
again uses a specific analyses to find misdirected funds, “results suggest 
serious problems of consistency when, for example, the U.K. central 
government provides direct support of £73.4 million for the Royal Parks, 
countryside and nature preservation, and £2,342 million for agriculture, 
fishing and forestry.”22 But is this really a conflict of consistency or 
simply a matter of overlap?  Does agriculture not sustain the countryside 
in a manner consistent with the aims of the British government?   
Conducting a sectoral economic study which details the manner in 
which each non-economic objective may be accomplished in a cheaper 
way begs the question of whether it may achieve all the stated objectives 
at once.  How does one quantify the cost of supporting the incomes of 
rural communities and the cost of maintaining rural landscapes when both 
of which are predicated on the existence of the farmer?  Assumptions on 
the cost of non-economic factors such as the maintenance of the rural 
landscape cannot be calculated in the same model that also advocates 
direct income support for farmers, as it eliminates farmers and inevitably 
alters the landscape regardless of current expenditures.  
The objectives of agricultural support are not simply policy 
proposals, they are the stated defense of conditions as they currently exist; 
they may be achieved at less cost in theoretical models, but would they 
exist in reality without the basic support of agriculture?  The question 
remains that if funds now allocated to supporting farmers are redistributed 
in a more economical and direct fashion to meet myriad non-economic 
                                                 
22 Id. at 255. 
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objectives, would these objectives even be met in the absence of the 
farmer? 
IV. A New Role for the State 
Globalization 
So much has been made of the phenomenon of globalization that it 
would redundant to produce an in depth analysis here.  Instead it will 
suffice to acknowledge that there has been a fundamental change in the 
ways in which actors communicate and business is conducted.  The 
essential point is that the power of the state to regulate its domestic 
economy has been reduced.  The various manifestations all have had a 
hand in the general process of lessening state power, including the 
instantaneous spread of information, electronic funds transfers, and 
increased capital mobility.  Against the backdrop of this altered landscape, 
schemes such as the EU’s CAP are a remnant from a simpler time.  The 
costs of this inefficient holdover can no longer be borne by domestic 
consumers and taxpayers, and it will no longer be tolerated by developing 
countries that will demand concessions before any further trade 
negotiations proceed.  That is, agricultural subsidization is a remnant that 
may no longer be conciliated domestically or internationally. 
WTO Compliance 
The most obvious avenue for easing the effects of liberalization 
may be found in the “Green Box” category of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Spending initiatives that fall into this category have the dual 
benefit of permitting agricultural spending while remaining WTO 
compliant.  Any number of policies that support agriculture may be 
contemplated so long as they are direct payments and not the indirect price 
supports that are trade distorting.  For instance, direct social spending for 
agricultural research would be WTO compliant while conceivably 
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furthering efficiency and rural landscapes.  Admittedly, this is not a 
complete solution and the larger problem remains of how to support 
farmers without unfair subsidies.  Direct welfare to families that continue 
to farm would only be a shift of support, and subsidization would continue 
to distort price realities.  Thus, the cost must be borne in the market and in 
the prices paid. 
Coordinating Civil Society 
Globalization has not ended an era of domestic autonomy but 
simply shifted its focus.  Governments may still foster autonomous 
domestic policy by educating the public on the consequences of 
agriculture, and indeed all, consumption.  A report from the EU’s 
Committee of the Regions entitled Opinion on the Common agricultural 
policy and the conservation of Europe’s cultural landscape23 illustrates 
the extent to which policymakers’ perception of agricultural policy as a 
mechanism of price support has broadened to include the diverse linkages 
of agriculture.  These non-trade benefits of agriculture, such as sustaining 
rural communities, protecting the environment, rural landscapes and 
tourism, should also be the responsibility of individuals.   
Governments need to coordinate public awareness with regulatory 
schemes that facilitate the articulation of domestic opinion.  Information 
campaigns and political debate could easily inform citizens of the 
consequences upon the non-trade objectives mentioned above.  Citizens 
must know that simply buying the cheapest product will come at the 
expense of promoting certain political issues.  Therefore, regulation will 
be required to differentiate between not only products, but also political 
                                                 
23 The Committee of the Regions, Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 14 June 
2000 on the Common agricultural policy and the conservation of Europe’s cultural 
landscape, available at 
http://coropinions.cor.eu.int/CORopinionDocument.aspx?identifier=cdr\commission2\do
ssiers\com2-013\cdr285-1999_fin_ac.doc&language=EN (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).  
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issues.  Of the many possibilities for regulatory differentiation, four appear 
especially salient; environmental, health and safety, geography, and brand 
name.  
Both environmental and health labeling would entail distinguishing 
between products based upon whether they conform to EU standards of 
agricultural production.  Although foreign products are not necessarily 
distinguished, consumers would receive the benefit of knowing whether a 
foodstuff is produced with a minimum of environmental degradation or 
genetic modification.  While WTO rules may not permit excluding a 
product, consumers should be informed of the practices that European 
governments do not support.  For instance, if cattle are raised in an 
environmentally harmful manner or are injected with various hormones 
the consumer should have the right to make an informed decision.    
The second group of labeling options is explicitly based upon 
location.  First, a form of geographic labeling could distinguish which 
products are produced locally.  This serves the dual aim of helping support 
local farmers and ensuring freshness.  The second geographic labeling 
measure, brand name, is much more complex.  It advocates treating 
agricultural products as other goods and protecting the usage of renowned 
names.  For example, French Rochefort cheese or Italian Parma Ham 
would not be universal food types but specific labels for food actually 
produced in that region24.  As Europe possesses a highly regarded 
agricultural tradition, especially in such areas as wine, cheese, or pasta, 
this presents an opportunity to develop Europe’s comparative advantage in 
agriculture.  But agriculture as source of brand names is problematic, for 
unlike the previous options that promote information, protecting 
                                                 
24 EU Trade Directorate, at http://www.europa.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).  
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agricultural names is restrictive and has international implications beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
The options given a thumbnail sketch above are not meant as 
concrete policy proposals but rather conceptual examples that indicate the 
role of information.  It is easy to be cynical of the ability of individuals to 
overcome self-interest, but the issue is much more elemental than daily 
choices in which consumers will have to pay more for the collective good.  
Public opinion may form collective conceptions that become accepted and 
then form part of the collective consciousness.  Consider the declining 
incidence of cigarette addiction in countries that have articulated strong 
anti-smoking campaigns, where information on the health risks associated 
with smoking gradually moves it to the periphery of social acceptance.  It 
is not inconceivable that articulated public opinion might extend from 
health to environmental or human rights issues.  For example, warning 
labels on Nike shoeboxes which alert the consumer to the use of child 
labour could do much toward furthering social concerns. 
V. Conclusion 
Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man was 
received with much attention in the early 1990s.  Fukuyama’s belief in 
liberalism as the final epoch of human development coincided nicely with 
congratulatory sentiments that were prevalent with the end of the cold war.  
Basically an affirmation of the Hegelian dialectic, The End of History 
argues that liberalism of the 18th Century remains the pinnacle of 
philosophical development.  Fukuyama reminds us that liberalism is a 
stable paradigm of thought that traces back to John Locke and Adam 
Smith, equally embracing liberty and the “invisible hand of the market”.  
But as state power is redefined in the process of globalization, the concept 
of individuals left under the invisible hand will have to be rethought.   
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It is useful to remember that the post WWII compromise of 
embedded liberalism was premised on both economic liberalism and 
legitimate social purpose.  Globalization has reduced the functioning of 
the state and removed the main instrument of protecting this legitimate 
social purpose.  The economic effects upon individuals are beyond 
contact, and beyond accountability as the political is subsumed into the 
international economic marketplace.  What it is occurring is not the simple 
extension of issues into the international arena, but the elimination of a 
level of political accountability.  Individuals may no longer have a 
political voice in economic issues that affect their society.  Only the 
market remains, and “a market is not necessarily democratic.”25   
If only the “invisible hand of the market” is left to order society, 
then absent will be fundamental democratic ideals. As the Canadian 
political scientist C.B. Macpherson commented, “We may still call it 
consumer sovereignty if we wish.  But the sovereignty of an aggregate of 
such unequal consumers is not evidently democratic.”26  The state must 
make the market a place where ideals have force.  Required is a system of 
informed and nuanced consumer choice in which the state articulates 
objectives that a majority of citizens support.  A form of nuanced 
consumption in which the costs support domestic concerns in the face of 
international trade hegemony.  If traditional institutions have less force in 
the articulation of democratic agendas, then democratic expression 
requires alternative forums.  In the end, the market must be made more 
accountable. 
 
 
                                                 
25 C.B. MACPHERSON, ThE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 86 (Oxford 
University Press 1977). 
26 Id. at 87.  
